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                                                             Chapter One 
 
                                                                 Introduction 
 
1.1 Abstract 
This research analyzes Truth Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms and Amnesties in 
the light of the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The research 
looks strictly into the legal terms of the Rome Statute in order to see if their interpretation 
indicates that the Court is meant to ‘complement1’ such forms of justice mechanisms, 
especially when they are accompanied by amnesties.  
 
 
1.2 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms and Amnesties 
 
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Mechanisms (hereafter TJRM)2 is a phrase which refers 
to all the legal and socio-legal mechanisms that a country implements when it emerges 
from a period of gross human rights violations or armed conflict.3  These mechanisms are 
also referred to as Alternative Justice Mechanisms because, in many cases, especially 
when they are accompanied by amnesties, they replace traditional criminal prosecutions.  
 
TJRM are a favorable response to violations because they are legally sanctioned to find 
facts, to establish an accurate record of a country’s past, to clarify uncertain events, and 
to lift the lid of silence and denial that covers a contentious and painful past.4 TJRM are 
also preferred to pure prosecutorial mechanisms because they are meant to respond to the 
                                                 
1 This term is derived from the principle of Complementarity which recognises primacy of national jurisdictions. 
2 Alternative Justice Mechanisms (AJM) in the context of this research is used interchangeably with Truth Justice 
and Reconciliation Mechanisms (TJRM). 
3 Roth-Arriaza, N. ‘The New Landscape of Transitional Justice’, in Roth-Arriaza/Mariezcurrena (eds.), (2006) 
Transitional Justice in the twenty-First Century.  2. 
4 Hayner, P. B. (2001) Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions. 24.  
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specific needs of victims, thus contributing to a broader concept of justice, accountability 
and reconciliation.5 TJRM may be seen as more viable when they complement criminal 
prosecutions6 because they offer more benefits and deal with a greater context of the root 
causes of a conflict than the highly formalized processes of determining culpability.7 
They may even be more preferable to individualized criminal prosecutions in the case of 
African societies, whose social ethos emphasizes negotiation, reconciliation, cooperation, 
and eventual integration into the society.8  
 
Amnesties in the course of transition may arise where the outgoing regime demands that 
they be applied as a condition precedent to the cessation of hostilities, or where they are 
used as a bargaining chip to encourage people to come forward and tell the truth. The 
former situations were experienced during the waves of democratization in Latin 
America in the 1980s,9 whereas the latter were experienced in South Africa in the early 
1990s.10  
 
Despite the viability of TJRM as forms of justice mechanisms they have not escaped 
criticism. The main problem with TJRM is that they have not been favorably considered 
by the international community in the advent of the universal fight against impunity.11 
                                                 
5 Ibi., 228-31. 
6 Steven, R.R and Jason, S.A. (1997) Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International law, Beyond the 
Nuremberg Legacy. 5.  
7 Minow, M. 'The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?', in Rotberg, R. &  Thompson, D. (eds.), 
(2000) Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions. 235.  
8 Oyelade, O.S, ‘Conflict Resolution and Human Rights in Traditional African Society’ (2005) 45, 2 Indian Journal 
of Human Rights. 201. 
9 Orentlicher, D. ‘‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency’, (2007) 1The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice. 11. 
10 Werle, G. ‘Without Truth, No Reconciliation. The South African Rechtsstaat and the Apartheid Past’ Lecture 
delivered on 18th May 1995 at the Law Faculty of Humboldt University of Berlin. 
11Huyse, L. ‘Justice’, in Bloomfield, D, Barnes, T, and Huyse, L (eds.), (2003) Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: 
A Handbook. 97-115. 
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The consequent conflict that may arise between the ICC and TJRM is that serious 
international crimes to go unpunished.12  
 
In overcoming the tensions between impunity and TJRMs, and as this research will show, 
there are many academics who suggest that the ideal situation, would be to have a 
mélange of both retributive and restorative justice mechanisms. Others, while not 
prioritizing on either mechanism, suggest that there should be primacy for the societies’ 
needs in coming to terms with their past, rebuilding their values and settling old 
disputes.13   
 
This research will however observe that, calling for criminal prosecutions of alleged 
high-profile criminals so as to satisfy the ideals traditional criminal prosecution on the 
one hand, and supplementing this with the creation of TJRM which fulfil the needs of a 
society on the other hand, appears too romantic an idea to realise in practice. This is 
because in many cases, the same crimes and the same people for which prosecution is 
made obligatory, are the same ones for which an amnesty may be sought. 
 
1.3 International Criminal Prosecutions and TJRM 
 
The Rome Statute14 establishes the ICC. The setting up of the ICC was as a result of 
decades’ old efforts to come up with an institution to fight impunity for the core crimes of 
                                                 
12 Robinson, D. ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal 
Court’ (2003)14 European Journal of International law. 484. 
13 Bore, L. ‘International Justice Mechanisms: An analysis of Retributive versus Restorative mechanisms’ (2006) 
(Unpublished), Dissertation, University of Nairobi (In file with Author). 18. 
14 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted Jul. 17 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (hereafter 
Rome Statute). 
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international law. The establishment of the ICC is the ultimate achievement of the 
endeavour to have an enforcement mechanism of International Criminal Law (hereafter 
ICL). 
TJRM on the other hand focus on alternative ways of accountability which are primarily 
based on the broader concepts of justice such as restoration and reconciliation.  
 
The two mechanisms of justice, that is TJRM and ICL, have developed more or less 
parallel to each other. However, in the course of the development of ICL, the concept of 
restorative justice has slowly begun to absorb itself into international criminal tribunals. 
This is evidenced by the Sierra Leonean Truth Commission which functions alongside 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Gacaca courts in Rwanda which try cases 
alongside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). These courts have had 
the challenge of interpreting the place of TJRM in the general discipline of international 
criminal prosecution. In light of these developments, there is need to ensure unequivocal 
conclusion of whether or not the Rome Statute embraces TJRM. 
 
This research hinges the discussions relating to the tensions between ICL and TJRM on 
the interpretation of the Rome Statute under the assumption that the ICC is most suitable 
and that it will form the motif of the enforcement of international criminal justice due to 
its non-limitation in terms of time, place and time. 
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1.4 The Research Question 
 
This research looks at whether or not, and how the Rome Statute recognizes 
TJRM/Amnesties.15 In that course, the research will look at the boundaries of interpreting 
the relevant provisions of the statute.  
 
1.5 Significance of the Research 
 
This research hopes to give insight on the place of TJRM/Amnesties not just within the 
Rome Statute, but also under the general rubric of ICL. In the course of answering this 
question, inevitable outcomes of the usefulness of alternative justice mechanism will be 
addressed.   
This research will also shed light to the contemporary issues relating to Kenya following 
the crimes committed in the 2007 post election violence.  
 
1.6 Objectives 
1. To analyse the International law delimitations of interpreting the Rome Statute; 
 
2. To comb through the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute in an attempt to 
clarify whether or not the ICC complements TJRM/Amnesties; and 
 
3. To make findings as to which provisions, if any, of the Rome Statute 
accommodate TJRM/Amnesties. 
 
                                                 
15 The term TJRM/Amnesties has been used throughout this research to indicate the general alternative justice 
mechanisms of truth, justice and reconciliation accompanied by amnesties. In some places, as will be indicated, the 
specific arguments will be divided to argue separately for or against amnesties. 
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1.7 Research Methodology 
In conducting the research, focus is mostly on the Rome Statute and the preparatory 
work preceding its creation.  This research will rely on International Conventions and 
published legal literature emanating from the hand of academics and experts in the fields 
of both ICL and TJRM. Online interviews on matters relevant to the topic are also 
carried out in order to obtain a practical insight on the issues at hand.  
 
1.8 Structure 
1. The subsequent chapter will look at the legal confines of interpreting the Rome 
Statute. This will involve looking at the Rome Statute, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) and international law in general. 
 
2.  The major part of the paper will then ‘unveil the Rome Statute’, through a systematic 
analysis of each of the mentioned provisions (Articles 16, 17, 20 and 53) and see 
whether or not, and with specificity, whether TJRM/Amnesties are accommodated in 
the Rome Statute.  
 
3. The conclusion will make a finding as to whether TJRM/Amnesties are 
accommodated in the Rome Statute. 
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2.0                                                    Chapter Two 
 
                                         Legal Boundaries of Interpretation 
 
2.1 The Rome Statute 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC shall apply the following as far 
interpretation is concerned: 
- In the first place, the Rome Statute itself and its rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;16  
- In the second place, applicable treaties, principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of international law and rules of armed conflict;17 
-  Failing this, the general principles of law derived from national laws of States 
that would normally exercise jurisdiction, international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards;18 and 
-  The ICC’s previous decisions, which shall be applied discretionally.19 
 
2.2 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
The VCLT is invoked in interpreting the Rome Statute because it is an applicable treaty20 
due to the fact that the Rome Statute is a treaty among States.21  
 
                                                 
16 Rome Statute Article 21(1) (a). 
17 Rome Statute Article 21(1) (b). 
18 Rome Statute Article 21(1) (c). 
19Rome Statute Article 21 (2). 
20 Rome Statute Article 21(1)b. 
21 Kourabas, M. ‘A Vienna Convention Interpretation of the ‘Interests of Justice’ Provision of the Rome Statute, The 
Legality of Domestic Amnesty Agreement, and the Situation in Northern Uganda: A Great Qualitative Step 
Forward’ or a Normative Retreat?’ (2007) 14 UC Davis Journal of International law and Policy at 69. 
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One golden rule of interpretation according to the VCLT is that a statute shall be 
interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the treaty and its 
purpose.22 The interpretation of a treaty is said to involve three main elements23: 
interpretation according to a provision’s ordinary meaning; according to its objects and 
purposes; and according to the provision’s context. 
 
2.3 International law 
The approach taken and the conclusion reached in making an interpretation must further 
be appreciative of international law. The relevant rules of international law that this 
chapter looks at are those specific ones relating to TJRM/Amnesties. This analysis will be 
useful in examining whether deferring prosecutions to local alternative justice 
mechanisms would be in violation of international law. 
 
2.3.1 TJRM/Amnesties under International law 
As there is no legally recognized definition of TJRM, the propriety of the mechanisms is 
judged according to the extent to which it fulfills its mandate.24 
 
There are however certain generally accepted standards of TJRM that have emerged from 
the previous TJRMs that have existed in the last ten years. These include; the requirement 
                                                 
22 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Entered into force on 27th January, 
1980, Adopted on 22 May 1969. (hereafter VCLT). 
23Kourabas, M. Supra note 20, 69. 
24 From 1997 to 2007, there have been at least 33 Truth Commissions in 28 different countries (Amnesty 
International, Transitional Justice and Reparation: Establishing an effective Commission, 11 June 2007, AI Index: 
POL 30/009/2007) available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2007/en/7988f852-d38a-11dd-
a329-2f46302a8cc6/pol300092007en.html (accessed on 20th October 2009). 
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that the process has a victim-centered approach,25 a fair procedure26 and that it 
recommends prosecution for international crimes.27  
 
In as much as there are no specified international legal rules accepting or rejecting 
TJRM/Amnesties, the liberty of States to apply them ends where the obligation to 
prosecute under international law starts. This means that the determination of the 
suitability of a TJRM will depend largely on whether it is inclusive or exclusive of an 
amnesty. In other words, whether the TJRM violates the international legal obligation to 
prosecute. 
 
2.3.2 Duty to prosecute under International law 
For relevance and brevity purposes, the duty to prosecute is discussed here only in the 
light of the crimes under the material jurisdiction of the ICC. These are: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression28. The discussion will however not delve 
into aggression as its prosecution will only take place when a viable definition for it has 
been agreed upon29. Further, as far as the addressee of this duty is concerned, these 
discussions will focus on that state that would be seeking to apply TJRM/Amnesties.  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 27. 
26 Ibid.  31. 
27 Ibid. 5-10. 
28 Article 5(1) Rome Statute. 
29 Politi, M. & Nesi.G. (eds.) (2005) The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression. Editors’ 
Preface. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
As far genocide is concerned, the Genocide Convention places an obligation on the state 
of commission to prosecute.30 In absence of a clear duty under customary international 
law, this duty only applies to state-parties to the Genocide convention.31 Some writers 
conclude that there is a customary law duty obligating ALL States to punish all persons 
who commit genocide in their territorial jurisdiction32, in light of, inter alia, advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ),33 and the fact that customary 
international law is said to establish universal jurisdiction over genocide.34 Others 
contend that the establishment of this duty under customary law is contentious due to lack 
of consistent state practice.35 
 
War crimes are constituted by those International Humanitarian Law (hereafter IHL) 
violations which create direct criminal responsibility under International law.36  There is 
a general obligation that States should suppress all IHL violations37. However, the States 
have the liberty to decide the means of suppressing these violations. The specific 
obligation to prosecute war crimes only exists in light of grave breaches, which are war 
crimes38, as is stipulated in the Geneva Conventions39 and Additional Protocol 140. These 
                                                 
30 Article 3 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 227 , Article 3, Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). 
31 Ambos, K. ‘The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the Role 
of the ICC’, in Kai Ambos et al. (eds.), (2009) Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional 
Justice, Peace and Development 15. 
32 Orentlicher, D. Supra note 9. 2566. 
33 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 
I.C.J 15, 23. 
34 Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 39 (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961),  36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. CL 
1962). 
35 See for example Ambos, K. Supra note 9, 15-16. 
36 Werle, G. Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (2009). 357. 
37 Articles 49(3), 50(3), 129(3) and 146(3) of Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV Respectively infra note 38 and 
Article 85(1) of Additional Protocol I, infra note 38. 
38 Olson, M. L. ‘Provoking the Dragon on the Patio, Matters of Transitional Justice: Penal Repression vs. 
Amnesties’ (2006) 88, International Review of the Red Cross. 280. 
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provisions however only apply to war crimes committed in international armed conflicts. 
War crimes may also be committed in non-international armed conflicts41, but the duty to 
prosecute them is blurred as they are not categorized as grave breaches. That 
notwithstanding, it has however been stated, that customary international law should not 
be granted to those who commit war crimes.42 The duty to prosecute for war crimes also 
faces the challenge that it only applies to state parties to the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols.43 
 
Crimes against humanity (hereafter CAH) are unique in that they are a pure creation of 
customary international law44 and the law is less clear as far as the duty to prosecute them 
is concerned45. It is noted that in fact, international law has tended to condone amnesties 
for CAH.46 There is however, emerging customary law that States have a duty to punish 
CAH when the conduct occurs on that state’s territory or with respect to its nationals.47 
This is also exemplified by the practice of the UN,48 international organizations49 and 
case law.50 There is however no specific legal obligation to punish CAH.51 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
adopted Aug. 12, 1949, Article. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 3, Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 
12, 1949, Article 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.LA.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, Article 130, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 
Article 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
40 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, adopted Jun. 8, 1977, Article 11(4), 84(3) & 85(4) 1125 U.N.T.S (1977). 
41 Henckaerts, J. and Doswald-Beck, L. Customary International law, 1, (2005). 574-590. 
42 Ibid.  612-613. 
43 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 15. 
44 Scharf, M. Scharf M. P. ‘The Amnesty exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.’ (1999) 
32 Cornell International law Journal.519. 
45Robinson, D. Supra note 12, 491. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons guilty of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. G.A. Res. 3074, 28 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No 30) at 79, U.N. Doc. AI 9030 
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The duty to prosecute for the crimes of genocide, war crimes and CAH humanity has 
also been asserted in view of comprehensive human rights conventions52. The general 
flow of this assertion starts where the commission of these crimes violates the rights 
enshrined in these conventions and concludes with the analogy that that the protection of 
these rights entails a mandatory duty to prosecute, as has been explained in the triad of 
‘human rights-duty to protect-duty to prosecute’.53 However, the emergent conclusion of 
States having a duty to prosecute is founded on interpretations54 and not the substantive 
provisions of the conventions. Some writers have stated that the duty of imposing penal 
sanctions in the course of ensuring protection should only apply with respect to the state 
of commission.55 
It is further stated, 56 which statement is concurred with, that the duty to uphold the 
rights enshrined in the human rights conventions does not imply an obvious and 
automatic duty to prosecute for their violations, since the duty to protect can be ensured 
through other means and not just prosecution. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1973); Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
opened for signature on Nov. 26, 1998, 754, U.N.T.S. 73, G.A. Res. 2391, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18), 40. 
49 Human Rights Watch, Special Issue: Accountability for past Human Rights Abuses 2 Dec. 1989. 
50 Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 132, 135 (1988) (Judgment of Jan. 26, 1984, Cass. Crim., Fr.). 
51 Scharf, M. P. Supra note 43. 519. 
52 International Convention on Civil and political Rights, Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, European. T.S. No. 5 
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted Dec. 9, 1985, 
OEA/ser.A./42 (1986), 67 O.A.S.T.S., reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986) (entered into force 1987). 
53 Werle, G. Supra note 35. 72. 
54 Velásquez-Rodríguez , 29 July 1988, Judgement, para. 162 et seq., 1996 Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights [209], OEA/Ser.L/V/III.35, doc. 4 (1997); Almonacid 
Arellano et al. vs. Chile , 26 September 200, Judgement, Series C No. 154. para. 110. 
55 Werle, G. Supra note 35. 72. 
56 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 16. 
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Beside the duty to prosecute imposed by treaties, another compelling reason for States to 
comply, is seen in light of  jus cogen57 norms and the consequent obligations erga 
omnes58 for which no derogation (such as failing to prosecute in light of an amnesty in 
place) is allowed.  
Bassiouni59 discusses whether the crimes in the ICC Statute have achieved the jus cogen 
status and whether the consequent obligations erga omnes include that of prosecuting.60 
Although there is vast literature indicating that crimes such as genocide, CAH and war 
crimes are among those considered to have attained the status of jus cogens61, he notes 
that it is uncertain whether the attainment of this status of  jus  cogens under 
international law attracts absolute and non-derogable obligations erga omnes.62 In 
narrowing the argument to the analysis at hand, he notes that there is no plausible stand 
as to whether a state’s duty to prosecute is absolute in light of the fact that prosecution is 
vital in securing non-derogable rights.63 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter the ICTY) has 
stated that the duty to prosecute for the crimes of genocide, CAH and war crimes exists 
under customary international law. 64 
                                                 
57 Jus cogen norms are norms which hold the highest hierarchical position among the norms of international law and 
are consequently non-derogable. 
58 Obligations erga omnes are the obligations that attach to a norm that has achieved the jus cogen status. 
59 Bassiouni, C. M. ‘International Crimes, Jus Cogen and Obligatio Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59 Law & Contemporary 
Problems, 65. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 68. 
62 Ibid. 74. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, ICTY, Case No. IT-95-17/1-7 (10 December 1998), paras 137-148 and 155. 
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In as much as the generality and universality of this duty may be unclear, there is a clear 
and unequivocal duty on the state of commission to prosecute international crimes when 
they are committed in its territory.65  
 
With respect to third States, universal jurisdiction only grants States authority and not 
responsibility to prosecute international crimes.66 The options for 3rd states are however 
limited to either prosecuting or extraditing (aut dedere aut judicare) when it comes to 
war crimes.67 For the other two crimes, genocide and CAH, there is no clear duty for 
third States to prosecute although in most cases the argument is said to tilt towards there 
being no duty to prosecute.68 
 
Further and more specifically is the fact that when a state is a party to the Rome Statute, 
the obligation to prosecute these crimes is more direct since state parties to the Rome 
Statute have higher obligations than non-state parties with respect to the obligation to 
prosecute.69 
 
The existence of a customary international law duty for all States to prosecute 
international crimes may be blurred as the above discussions indicate. However, it must 
be conceded that the duty is more compelling upon the state of commission and even 
much more compelling when that state of commission is a party to the Rome Statute. The 
                                                 
65 Werle, G. Supra note 35. 69. 
66 Ibid. 70. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid, 71. 
69 Stahn, C. ‘Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative guidelines for the 
International Criminal Court’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice. 707. 
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State of commission is most reasonably and practically the one that would be seeking to 
implement a TJRM/Amnesties. The level of justification needed for this State to 
implement TJRM/Amnesties for the State of commission will be higher than that of the 
State of nationality of the perpetrator, and even much higher and clearer when the State 
of commission is a party to the Rome Statute. Third States retain their authority to 
prosecute even in light of an amnesty in place and are not limited by such an amnesty.70 
 
Despite the growing consensus that amnesties and pardons are generally incompatible 
with the Rome Statute,71 they have been extensively applied in light of various challenges 
for societies in transition. It is important to hence look at the possible justifications that 
may be fronted in order to admit a process that entails amnesties, and especially with 
regard to international crimes, to the ambit of the ICC.  
 
2.3.3 A sustainable Compromise 
This section looks at a possible balance which would not offend the international legal 
obligation to prosecute, and at the same time, one which would not hinder the attempts of 
a nascent democracy emerging from either an armed conflict or a period of human rights 
violations.  
 
Most suggestions on compromise render an outcome of partial accountability and partial 
impunity,72 either characterized by prosecuting some people (who bear the most 
                                                 
70 Prosecutor v. Kallon Kamara, SCSL (Appeals Chamber) Decision of 13 March 2004, paras 67 et seq. 
71Ibid. 701; Orentlicher, D. Supra note 9. 2598. 
72 Morris, H. M. ‘International guidelines facilitating accountability’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 
33; Ambos, K. Supra note 30 at 52; Robinson, D. Supra note 12, 49. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
responsibility for international crimes), or prosecuting for some of the crimes (those that 
carry the international legal obligation to prosecute) and not others.  
 
Keller contributes very insightful comments to this debate73. The special usefulness of 
her arguments is that they abandon the common arguments which conclude that 
amnesties are applicable so long as they are not granted in respect of international 
crimes that call for prosecution. Her departure from the common argument is based on 
the realisation that despite the duty of States to prosecute certain crimes, there are 
situations, where prosecution will not work.74 In overcoming this, she suggests 
principled guidelines which should judge the suitability of an AJM.  
These guidelines are characterised by three elements based on necessity, legitimacy and 
an assessment of whether the AJM meets the goals of international criminal justice.  
On necessity, she argues that the AJM would be necessary if prosecution would end any 
real chance for establishing peace and if it is the last resort to secure peace.75 She refers 
to other academic writers who agree on the point of necessity.76  
 On legitimacy, she argues that the AJM must be created by a democratic government or 
international body, whose formation must represent the will of the people based on non-
discrimination77.  
                                                 
73 Keller, M. L. ‘Achieving Peace with Justice: The ICC and the Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms’ (2008) 
23 Connecticut Journal of International law. 209-279. 
74 Keller, M. L. Ibid, 261. 
75 Keller, M.L. Ibid, 262. 
76 Majzub, D. ‘Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court’, (2002) 3 Melbourne Journal of 
International law 276; Naqvi, Y. ‘Amnesty for War Crimes: Defining the Limits of International Recognition’, 
(2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 617; Scharf M.P. Supra note 23, 512. 
77 Keller, M. L. Supra note 72, 263. 
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On the third element, she states that the acceptability of an AJM must be judged 
according to the extent to which it meets the goals of criminal justice (retribution, 
deterrence, expressivism, restorative justice and reconciliation).78 
 
Balint79 is another writer who states that the worth of criminal justice in post conflict 
situations must be assessed with reference to each particular situation. 80 She furthers 
her argument by stating that the usefulness of accountability must be weighed against 
its contribution to the protection, restoration and improvement of public order.81 
 
Robinson, partly concurring with the views of Keller, states that where the alternative 
mechanisms, can be considered as ‘genuine’ and where they closely meet the goals of 
accountability, deference to a TJRM  may be possible under the 'complementarity' 
regime82. 
 
Ambos83 offers a suggestion on how to balance the tensions through a sophisticated 
balancing of conflicting interests of peace and justice.84 He highlights a threefold 
proportionality test which was developed by the German Constitutional Court and 
refined by a certain scholar called Alexis.  
These three steps involve the following: Firstly, whether the amnesty is important in 
furthering the needs of peace. Secondly, whether the measure to be applied, in this case 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 265-278. 
79 Balint, J.L. ‘The Place of Law in Addressing Internal Regime Conflicts’ (1996) Law & Contemporary Problems. 
80Ibid. 110. 
81 Ibid. 114. 
82 Robinson, D. Supra note 12, 486. 
83 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 
84 Ibid at 33-38. 
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the TJRM, is indispensible or necessary to achieve the said objective. The third element 
is what he refers to as proportionality sricto sensu, which calls for the balancing 
between the extent of departure from full prosecution and the severity of the measures 
necessitating such a deviation.  Under this third element, that is proportionality stricto 
sensu, the measures that would necessitate deviation from full prosecution must be 
limited by the following factors:  
- limitation ratione materiae, which regards the specific crimes that international law 
seeks to prosecute; 
- limitation ratione personae with regard to those who are most responsible for the said 
commission of the crimes; 
- the stage where the investigations have reached, where he suggests that the more 
advanced the stage of prosecution the more deserved the deferral since at that time, 
some of the truth about the case has been uncovered; 
- the existence of some form of accountability and/or public procedure which results in 
a disclosure of the facts, identification of those responsible; 
- a consideration of the overall political, social and economic effects of the measures. 
 
Scharf’85 argues that amnesty is not equivalent to impunity and that there are other    
fundamentals of criminal justice which can still be satisfied when amnesties are   
 accompanied by truth commissions, lustrations, and other reconciliatory mechanisms.86 
Scharf’s determination of the suitability of an AJM is also based on considerations of   
whether the crimes committed are international crimes which carry an obligation to 
                                                 
85 Scharf, M.P. Supra note 43. 512. 
86 Ibid. 
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prosecute, the indispensability of such alternative processes in the transition, whether a 
process to uncover the truth has been instituted, whether deterrent mechanism for IHL 
and Human Rights violations have been instituted and whether the state has taken steps 
to punish those who are guilty through non-criminal sanctions. 87 
 
Werle, in somewhat concurring with the proposed arguments on necessity, states that 
an amnesty can only be considered as legitimate if it is absolutely necessary to end 
ongoing violence.88 Prior to that, he however cautions that an across-the-board 
exemption from criminal responsibility is unacceptable because it is discordant with the 
international legal obligation to prosecute.89 
 
Goldstone and Fritz90 depart from the general argument and subjects the acceptability 
of amnesty processes to their compliance with internationally accepted guidelines 
which are consistent with the interests of justice. In furthering this argument, they first 
concede that the objectives of criminal justice are mainly achieved through criminal 
prosecutions. However, they continue, prosecutions should not be insisted upon where 
they destabilise nascent democracies such as the case where the perpetrators are the 
ones that command state power, and insistence on prosecution may provoke the 
collapse of such a state.91  
 
                                                 
87Ibid, 526-527. 
88 Werle, G. Supra note 35. 77. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Goldstone, J.R. & Fritz, N. ‘‘In the Interests of Justice’ and the Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor’s 
Unprecedented Powers’ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International law, 655. 
91 Goldstone, J.R. & Fritz, N. Supra note 89. 659. 
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A state which grants amnesties can also plead necessity92 and force majeure93 in 
granting amnesties and consequently failing to meet its international legal obligation to 
prosecute. 
However, for any of the two doctrines to be invoked, it must be shown that a state 
exercised due diligence in performing its international obligation. It is noted that there 
are certain situations where a transitional government may not be in a position to 
comply with even modest requirements of international law, such as where the military 
retains de facto power after relinquishing office.94 However, despite the fact that the 
excuse for non-performance of duty under these two doctrines is arguable, international 
law does not offer satisfactory answers as to whether this situation excuses the state 
from performing its functions.95   
 
As far as these two doctrines are concerned, and drawing analogy from the fact that 
some human rights conventions allow for derogations in times of emergency,96 this 
research observes that there are certain times when necessity and impossibility may 
indeed push a state to derogate from its international legal obligation to prosecute. 
 
International law does have obligations for prosecution of international crimes, as    
seen above, but international law does not-yet-prohibit amnesties.97 Further,   
                                                 
92Necessity precludes the wrongfulness of an act of state, which wrongfulness is not in conformity with an 
international legal obligation if the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the state against a 
grave and imminent peril 
93 Force Majeure is a defence that a state may advance to excuse it from performing a duty due to impossibility. 
94 Orentlicher, D. Supra note 9. 2607. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Dugard, J. ‘Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option?’ (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of 
International law, 1004. 
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  prosecutorial discretion under the ICC gives opportunity for the consideration of   
  amnesties.98 
 
In light of the foregoing suggestions, this research observes and concurs with the 
discussed measures for determining the acceptability of TJRM/Amnesties vis a vis the 
international legal obligation to prosecute. This research proposes the following as the 
basic minimum requirements to be met in determining whether the ICC should 
recognize a TJRM with the power to grant amnesties for crimes within its jurisdiction. 
- firstly there has to be a situation which calls for the balancing of the needs 
public order (those which contribute to the protection, restoration and 
improvement of public order) on the one hand, and those of formal criminal 
justice on the other hand; and  
- this balance must indicate a tilt or a threat of it against the public order of a 
State if formal prosecutions are instituted; 
- the employing of am AJM with amnesties must be indispensable to the 
maintenance of this balance. 
- the amnesty programme must also meet the requisite of legitimacy as 
described by Keller99 above; and 
- there has to be sufficient indication that the state in question is not condoning 
international crimes and is indeed diligent to see to their prosecution but due to 
prevailing circumstances at that time, the goals of criminal justice cannot 
coexist with those of public order. 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 Keller, M.L. Supra note 72. 263. 
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3.0                                               Chapter Three  
 
                                        Interpreting the Provisions. 
 
3.1 Background to the current situation of TJRM/Amnesties in the Rome 
Statute. 
During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the question of TJRM/Amnesties was 
overshadowed by the international community’s grand ambition to fight 
impunity100.  
It is however clear that amnesties and its related issues were within the agenda of 
the Preparatory Committee to the ICC.101 As early as 1997, the United States 
(hereafter US) suggested the inclusion of amnesties in the interest of peace and 
national reconciliation.102 During the negotiations, some delegations (especially 
the South African one) sought explicit recognition of TJRM by the ICC.103  No 
agreement was however reached as the drafters left the situation ambiguous, 
leaving its clarification to the ICC once it came to operation.104 The drafting of 
the Statute was stated to reflect a ‘creative ambiguity’.105 
 
                                                 
100 Robinson, D. Supra note 12; Paragraph 3-5 preamble, Rome Statute. 
101 R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (1999). 45.  
102See Generally U. S. Delegation Draft (Rev.) to the ICC Preparatory Committee (August 1997). 
103 Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 499. 
104 Ibid. 
105 This is the terminology used by Scharf Supra while referring to an interview he had with President Phillip Kirsch 
of the ICC (Strasbourg, France, 19 November 1998) on the issue of amnesties in the Rome Statute. 
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However, in as much as the issues were raised in the negotiations leading to the 
adoption of the Rome Statute, opinions were divided as to whether and how the 
question of TJRM/Amnesties should be treated.   
Protagonists of the ICC emphasized that its role is to fight impunity. Another 
group contended that States should not be denied the right to adopt measures that 
they consider to be good for their transitional democracies106. Others still, were 
of the view that abuse of discretion would result if States were given the choice 
of whether or not to grant amnesties.107 The States also expressed their 
reservations based on the fact that it would be difficult to state conclusively 
which reconciliation measures would be acceptable and which ones would not.108 
 
The Rome Statute therefore has no specific provision on the relationship between 
prosecutions on the one hand and TJRMs/Amnesties on the other hand as no 
agreement was reached during the negotiation.109  
 
3.2 Relevant Provisions 
Some academics who have written on the subject, submit that Articles 16, 17 and 
53 are the avenues through which the subject of TJRM/amnesties could be most 
appropriately dealt with.110 Others have included Article 20 in the list of possible 
avenues.111 
                                                 
106 Clark, T.H. ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Amnesties and the Interests of Justice: Striking a 
Delicate Balance’ (2005) 4 Washington University Global Studies Law Review. 390. 
107Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 483. 
108Morris, M. 'Foreword', (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems. 1. 
109 Werle, G. Supra note 35. 112. 
110Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 486 ; Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 699; Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 57-69. 
111 Scharf, M. P. Supra note 43. 525. 
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In line with the views of these academic writers, it is submitted that one has to 
look collectively at Articles 16, 17, 20 and 53 as the most suitable fulcrums for 
the debate on the applicability of TJRM/Amnesties within the framework of the 
Rome Statute.  
 
3.2.1 Article 16 
 
Article 16 gives the Security Council (hereafter SC) power to request the ICC not 
to commence with any investigations or proceed with any prosecutions for a 
renewable period of 12 months.112  Practically, this provision allows the SC to 
request the ICC not to proceed with proceedings because they would be 
detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security.113 Article 16 is said to be a 
compromise between those who sought that the SC should exercise complete 
control over the ICC and those who thought that that would amount to political 
interference.114  
The business of this chapter is to see whether a TJRM would be recognised by the 
ICC under Article 16. 
 
The prerequisite for a SC action under Chapter VII is that there exists a threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.115 The basis of the power of 
the SC is to allow suspension of proceedings if they conflict with considerations 
                                                 
112 Article 16. Rome Statute. 
113 Triffterer, O. (2008) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers’ notes, 
Article by Article 2nd ed. 603. 
114 Holmes, 'The Principle of Complementarity', in R. S. Lee Supra note 14; Bergsmo and Peji, 'Article 16: Deferral 
of Investigation or Prosecution' in O. Triffterer ibid. 
115 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 717. 
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of peace and justice.116 Besides the fact that there has to be a compelling reason 
for such a deferral, the SC must find that the proceedings stand in the way of its 
efforts to give effect to peace and justice.117 
   
Different views have been fronted as far as the applicability of TJRM/Amnesties 
under Article 16 is concerned. While some contend that this provision would be 
an avenue for considering TJRM/Amnesties,118 others state that there would be a 
challenge because of the temporary nature of the request for a deferral.119 Another 
view posits that Article 16 would be an uncommon avenue for TJRM/Amnesties 
because a situation has to be serious enough, such as where there is an ongoing 
armed conflict, to warrant a request for deferral based on an amnesty in place.120 
Other writers subject the propriety of the argument on whether the SC’s request 
includes non-prosecution for crimes that carry the international legal obligation to 
prosecute.121 
It has also been asserted that the purpose of the deferral is to facilitate the 
brokering of peace and not validate an alternative justice model.122  In this regard 
therefore, the priority of the ICC is the brokering of peace and not the 
TJRM/Amnesties. 
                                                 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid.  
118 Keller, M.L. ‘The False Dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 3, 1 
Hague Justice Journal. 18. 
119 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 68; Gavron, J. ‘Amnesties in the light of Developments in International law and the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 109; 
Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 717. 
120 Gavron, J. Ibid. 109.  
121 Scharf, M.P. supra note 43. 524; Keller, M.L. Supra note 117. 19; Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 68. 
122 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 717. 
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Another line of argument departs from the general issues of TJRM/Amnesties and 
states that in any case, the ICC is not a creature of the UN and SC decisions 
should not be imposed on the ICC.123 This means that even if the SC indeed 
recognizes an AJM and makes a specific request to the ICC not to proceed on the 
basis that the ICC proceedings would interfere with the SC’s peace efforts, the 
ICC would not be bound by such a decision. The resolution of such an issue 
would fall back on the principle of competenz competenz upon which the ICC 
would determine its right of jurisdiction as stated by the ICTY.124 
 
This research, guided by the existing literature summarised above, proposes two 
possible arguments for invoking TJRM/Amnesties under Article 16. These are: 
- ‘For reasons of peace and security’ argument; and 
- ‘The meaning of justice’ argument. 
 
On the first argument, (‘for reasons of peace and security’) this research submits a 
further dichotomy where either the SC’s decision for suspension of proceedings 
from the ICC validates a TJRM/Amnesties by default, and where it validates the 
TJRM/Amnesties process purposefully and intentionally. 
 
Validation by default would occur where the SC has made a request for deferral to 
the ICC for reasons of peace and security. The state then proceeds to establish a 
TJRM in the absence of an ICC prosecution. This argument however does not 
                                                 
123 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 68. 
124 Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY, (Jurisdiction) (1996) 35 ILM 35.  
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make a direct link between Article 16 and the SC mandate because the SC is 
oblivious to the existence of the TJRM. Its mention is, however useful because it is 
the suspension of proceedings that enables the TJRM to take effect. Further, the 
TJRM proceedings exist, without interference to the ICC, for a limited period of 12 
months. The TJRM could be inclusive of exclusive of amnesties as would be 
deemed fit by the State effecting them. 
 
The second part of the dichotomy of the ‘for reasons of peace argument’ is where 
the SC specifically and purposefully instructs the ICC not to prosecute due to a 
TJRM/Amnesty which is in place and upon which the peace and security of a state 
hinges. In this way, the SC will call for a deferral specifically because there is a 
delicate non-prosecutorial truth and reconciliation process underway.125  This is the 
most likely avenue for a TJRM to be invoked under Article 16. As far as this 
assertion goes, it is submitted that not only is this possible but would be legally 
acceptable, in accordance with the mandate of the SC since it would in any case be 
an effort to achieve peace. The only challenge here would be that once the 12-
month period has expired and the threshold meriting SC intervention is over, 
nothing would prevent the ICC from commencing criminal proceedings. However, 
until now, there has been no real, practical situation where the argument suggested 
here has been applied. 
 
                                                 
125Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 484. 
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As some of the experts above have stated,126 the SC must also honour a State’s 
duty to prosecute for international crimes. However, there are times when the SC 
has specifically recognised and even endorsed processes which included an 
amnesty. For instance, the SC recognised an amnesty in Haiti stating that that was 
the only viable solution at the time.127 Once again, with regard to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (hereafter DRC), the SC supported the Lusaka ceasefire 
agreement, stating that it represented the most viable basis for the resolution of 
conflict in the DRC.128  
 
The second argument submitted by this research with regard to Article 16 is 
called the ‘the meaning of justice’ argument. This argument would hold if two 
assumptions are made. The first is that peace and justice are strongly 
interconnected,129 and that in order to have peace, justice is imperative. The 
second assumption is that justice in this regard, refers to the broader concept 
including non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms. 
 
  As far as the first assumption goes, it has been submitted that indeed, the SC plays 
a decisive role when the requirements of peace and justice seem to be in 
                                                 
126 Scharf, M. Supra note 43. 77. 
127 Statement of the President of the Security Council of 15 July 1993, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security 
Council 1993, 48 SCOR, at 126, UN Doc.S/26633(1993). 
128 Stahn, C, Supra note 68. 195. 
129 Jallow, B.H. ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice’ (2005) 3 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice. 154. 
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conflict130. The Security Council has previously reinforced the point of peace 
being realized through judicial action131.  
Regarding the second assumption, of justice being construed in broader terms, SC 
has previously acknowledged that the establishment of the ICTR would contribute 
to national reconciliation and the restoration and maintenance of peace and 
security.132  
 
This study primarily endorses the general consensus, as affirmed by Keller,133 that 
the basic consideration for the SC’s deferral power is when prosecution fatally 
threatens a peace deal affecting international peace and security.The existence of a 
TJRM is a secondary concern to the SC.  
 
Failing SC practice, and taking into account the above-mentioned considerations, it 
has to be conceded here that Article 16 is a very unlikely avenue for dealing with 
TJRM/Amnesties. 
However, this provision tells us something that is germane to the discussion 
inherent in the research paper. The fact that the duty to prosecute can be abrogated 
from, even for a limited period, indicates that this duty is not as sacrosanct  as it 
appears, and that certain concessions can be made when, as this provision alludes 
to, peace and security concerns are at stake. This is indeed true because the ability 
                                                 
130 Triffterer, O. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers’ notes, Article by 
Article 2nd Edition, (2008). 598. 
131 UN Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) of 22 Feb 1993 para 9 preamble; Security Council Resolution 
827(1993) of 25 May 1993 Preamble para 6. 
132 Resolution 955(1994) S/RES/955(1994) 8 November 1994. 
133Keller, L.M. Supra note 117. 20. 
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to request for deferral by the SC indicates that there are times when peace efforts 
need to be given priority over international criminal justice.134 
 
3.3 Article 17 
Article 17 is particularly important in this research because the issues of how to 
deal with amnesties were specifically raised during its drafting.135  
This provision starts by noting Paragraph 10 of the preamble and Article 1, both 
of which state in part that the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions. This means that the ICC will proceed with prosecutions if the state 
is unwilling to carry out the proceedings effectively.  
The court has read an additional test of admissibility where the state has remained 
‘inactive’.136 This additional test leads this research to conclude that the 
considerations of willingness and genuineness will only be made if there is 
‘something’ being done by the state. 
 
The different situations which would render a case inadmissible are discussed 
next, with a note of how the provision would be construed as inclusive of TJRM 
processes.  
Situation 1: Where a case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which 
has jurisdiction over it, unless that state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution137 
                                                 
134 Trifterer, O. Supra 129. 599. 
135Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 
136 Trifterer, O. Supra note 129. 16;  Schabas infra note 154. 174; Prosecutor V Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-8. Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, 10 Feb. 2006, para. 29. 
137 Article 17(1) a Rome Statute. 
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The leeway for TJRM:  
A TJRM would be considered as a barring admissibility before the ICC if the term 
investigation is construed to be inclusive of TJRM processes. If the conclusion is 
that a TJRM process can be construed as an investigation process, hence barring 
admissibility before the ICC, the next consideration would be whether the 
investigations were conducted willingly, genuinely and ably by the state. The 
analysis as far as this is concerned shall be on the meaning of ‘investigations’, 
‘willingness’ and ‘genuine’.  
 
Situation 2: Where a case has already been investigated by a state with 
jurisdiction over it, and that state has decided not to prosecute unless the decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state to genuinely prosecute.138 
 
Leeway for TJRM: The analysis here will look at the kind of ‘decisions not to 
prosecute’ that this section refers to. If such include those made by a TJRM (that 
is after investigations, the TJRM makes a decision not to prosecute by granting 
amnesty), then indeed this provision can be construed as addressing 
TJRM/Amnesties. 
 
Situation 3: The person has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of 
the complaint, and a trial against him is not permitted under Article 20 (3) of the 
                                                 
138 Article 17(1) b Rome Statute. 
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ICC Statute. This situation is discussed elsewhere in this research139 and therefore 
will not be repeated here. 
 
Interpretation 
i. Meaning of investigations 
There is general consensus from the sum of academic writers consulted in the 
course of this research, that the term ‘investigations’ in Article 17 is to be 
interpreted liberally. 
These liberal interpretations range from broad constructions such as ‘some form 
of inquiry’ into the facts140 to other processes which are acceptable despite being 
non-judicial,141 non-criminal142 and non-prosecutorial.143 
The term investigation is elsewhere delimited by excluding historical fact-finding 
processes.144 
Other interpretations specify the quality of the process by stating that it must 
include a systematic,145 and methodological146 inquiry into the facts. These facts 
must establish evidence,147 and individualize criminal responsibility.148 
                                                 
139 See 3:2:3. Infra. 
140 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 710. 
141 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 61. 
142 Scharf, M.P. Supra note 43. 525. 
143 Keller, L.M. Supra note 117. 23. 
144 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 710. 
145 Aravena, C. C. ‘The admissibility test before the International Criminal Court under Special Consideration of 
Amnesties and Truth Commissions’ in Kleffner, J. K & Kor, G. (eds) Complementary Views on Complementarity, 
Proceedings of the International Roundtable on the Complementary Nature of the International Criminal Court, 
(2004). 144. 
146 Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 500. 
147 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 710; Ibid. 
148 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 60; Stahn, C. Supra  note 68. 710-711. 
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As regards the outcome, the process must be purposed at making an objective 
determination in accordance with important criteria149 with a possibility of 
criminal proceeding. 150 
 
This research adopts the position that indeed the term investigation under Article 
17 is to be construed liberally, to also include the investigations carried out by a 
TJRM. 
  
ii. Willingness/Unwillingness to investigate 
According to the statute, this research observes that willingness or unwillingness 
is determined in two ways:  
- Whether the proceedings (whether or ongoing or completed) are purposed 
at shielding the person from criminal responsibility151.  
- Inconsistency to bring a person to justice which can be indicated by 
unjustified delay or lack of independence/impartiality in the proceedings.152   
 
Although this provision does not mention it, the list of hints given in determining 
unwillingness are not closed and the court is at liberty to include other 
considerations such as ‘the intent to shield’.153 This research firstly concurs that 
                                                 
149 Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 500. 
150Aravena, C.C. Supra note 144.  
151 Article 17 (2) (a). 
152 Article 17 (2) (b) & (c). 
153 Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 500. 
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the term ‘proceedings’, that is referred to above is inclusive of both prosecutorial 
and non-prosecutorial processes.154  
 
It has been noted that unwillingness would arise where a national justice system is 
undertaking some steps to disguise and make it look like it is investigating or 
prosecuting155. Delay is usually characterized by a prolonged period which is 
unjustified in the relevant circumstances. Impartiality on the other hand would be 
indicated by the possibility of bias and influence of the parties in the process. In 
assessing delays, it has been stated, that such is shown when the proceedings 
(both formal and informal) seem to take longer than other similar proceedings in 
the state concerned156. 
 
iii. Meaning of ‘shielding the person from criminal responsibility’ and ‘steps 
inconsistent with bringing the person to justice’ 
Aravena notes that the element of ‘shielding from criminal prosecution’ must be 
manifested by the ongoing prosecutions, the motive and the overall intent of the 
state and not just that of an implementing organ157.  
 
 Scharf brings in a differing opinion and states that the phrase ‘bringing the person 
to justice’ is likely to require criminal proceedings.158 Ambos is of the opinion 
that “purpose” in ‘purpose of shielding a person from criminal responsibility’ 
                                                 
154 Aravena, C.C. Supra note 144. 123. 
155 Schabas, W. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001). 67. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Aravena, C.C. Supra note 144. 123. 
158 Scharf, M.P. Supra note 43, 525. 
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indicates a subjective interpretation which is aimed at protecting the person 
concerned from criminal justice.159 According to him therefore shielding one from 
criminal responsibility is an element of protecting a person from criminal justice. 
 
Stahn suggests that proceedings are intended to shield someone from criminal 
responsibility if they exempt certain groups of perpetrators or members of 
governmental forces from prosecution.160 It has been suggested, a suggestion that 
this research paper agrees with, that an effective TJRM process cannot be said to 
be aimed at shielding persons from criminal prosecution since its primary purpose 
is reconciliation and not to bend the rules of criminal justice for the sake of 
impunity.161 It has, however, been suggested that if the notion ‘for the purpose of 
shielding …’ is interpreted in light of both the aim and effect, then there is less 
flexibility as to whether TJRM/Amnesties are intended to shield one from 
criminal responsibility.162 This means that whatever the original intent was, the 
eventual effect is that the person will not be prosecuted. 
 
As far as ‘intent to bring the person concerned to justice’ is concerned, Stahn 
remarks that the interpretation depends on the meaning of the term ‘justice’. If the 
term is strictly defined as criminal justice, then there is very little leeway for the 
recognition of quasi-judicial proceedings which do not provide for criminal 
                                                 
159 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 62. 
160 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 714. 
161 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 715. 
162 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 725. 
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sanctions.163 Another view states that a State is said to be shielding one from 
justice if the state is fulfilling the letter but not the spirit of the statute, by 
instituting sham proceedings to shield the person from criminal responsibility.164  
 
This research submits that proceedings would be purposed at shielding one from 
criminal responsibility, if there are indications that indeed that was the raison 
d’être of the proceedings. Further, the TJRM’s actual objective must come out to 
be secondary as indicated by, for instance, laxity in fulfilling its restorative justice 
aspect.  
 
iv. Decision not to proceed with prosecution 
Just like many other points under consideration, there is not yet any case law 
regarding this aspect of Article 17.165 The acceptability of a decision not to 
proceed with prosecution as a bar to prosecution is hinged on whether the decision 
was a deliberate attempt to shield a person from criminal responsibility, which 
phrase has been analyzed above. 
The decision not to prosecute must not be as a result of where a state omitted to 
prosecute and consequently granted a de facto blanket amnesty166. The decisions 
must be made on a case by case basis meeting any conditions set forth by Article 
                                                 
163 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 716. 
164 Trifterer, O. Supra note 129. 623. 
165 Trifterer, O. Supra note 129. 617. 
166 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 39. 
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17(2) (3)167. Further, a consideration must be made on whether the decision was 
made as a result of the merits of a case or whether other factors played a role.168 
 
v. Meaning of genuinely 
According to the Oxford Dictionary (which was consulted during its drafting), the 
word genuinely means ‘having the supposed character, not sham or feigned’. The 
term “genuinely” replaced the previous term ‘ineffective’ as had been suggested by 
the International Law Commission.169 The word genuinely was taken so as to 
include situations where the Court would take into account actions taken by the 
state in good faith but which proved insufficient for lack of resources, or weakness, 
or structures, or personnel.170  
Some writers have stated that genuinely means that the investigations and 
prosecutions are conducted in a manner consistent with the aims of the Rome 
Statute.171 In the context of investigations or prosecutions, lack of genuineness 
connotes a mock proceeding.172  
 
Ambos comments that the term “genuineness” connotes good faith and seriousness 
on the part of the state concerned with regard to investigations and prosecution. He 
                                                 
167 Aravena, C.C. Supra note 144. 136.  
168  Ibid. 
169 Greppi, E. ‘Inability to Investigate and Prosecute under Article 17’ in Mauro Politi & Federica Gioia (eds.). 
(2008) The International Criminal Court and National jurisdictions. 65. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 160. 
172 Aravena, C.C. Supra note 144. 121. 
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argues that a state which sets up a TJRM with the ultimate goal of peace in mind 
would be considered to be genuinely unwilling to prosecute173. 
 
Robinson also gives some guidelines on what constitutes genuineness. He states 
that the circumstances that must be taken into consideration include the nature and 
credibility of the Commission and the extent to which any departures from 
prosecution is justified by necessity. Some of the hall marks that the ICC would 
look at in making this determination include: The quasi-judicial character of the 
proceedings (such as whether the TJRM body requires the person concerned to 
appear before the decision making body), the independence of the body and its 
effectiveness in carrying out the mandate (whether it has the requisite resources, 
and powers).174  
 
Having made all these arguments regarding Article 17, this research submits that 
TJRM are indeed addressed under this provision but only qualify as barring 
admissibility before the ICC if the preconditions discussed above are met. This 
research further concurs with the tripartite test suggested by Stahn, who suggests 
that in order that TJRM be recognized as a bar to admissibility before the ICC, 
there must have been an investigation carried out, the state concerned must have 
adopted a decision not to prosecute and the decision must not have resulted from 
the state’s unwillingness or inability to prosecute.175 It has been suggested, which 
suggestion this study endorses, that the statutory language of Article 17 is 
                                                 
173Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 63. 
174 Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 500. 
175 Stahn, C. Supra note 68. 710. 
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sufficiently ambiguous to allow a determination allowing deferral of the case to the 
domestic justice authorities.176 
Further, this research observes, that once States have started a process that can 
qualify as ‘investigations’ according to the analysis above, then the ICC ought to 
give that state a chance to pursue it, because in any case, the ICC still has a chance 
to intervene based on its power to carry out periodic reviews of the 
investigations.177 
 
Article 20 (ne bis in idem). 
The principle of ne bis in idem precludes persons from being tried or punished 
twice for the same crime.178 This provision states that no person who has been tried 
by another court for conduct proscribed under the Rome Statute shall be tried by the 
ICC for the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: 
- were for the purpose of shielding him/her from criminal responsibility; or 
- were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with 
the principles of due process recognized by international law; or 
- were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with bringing the person concerned to justice. 
 
The leeway for TJRM: This provision would be said to include TJRM if the 
term ‘trial’ also refers to TJRM/Amnesties.  
If the answer be in the affirmative, the subsequent questions will be:  
                                                 
176 Keller, L.M. Supra note 117. 21. 
177 Article 18(5) Rome Statute. 
178 Bassiouni, C.M. The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court’ 1, (2005). 160. 
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a. what is the definitive criteria for determining whether 
or not the process of a TJRM/amnesties was or was not for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility; and 
b. whether that process was conducted according to 
international standards.  
 
Scharf states that an accused person can rely on this article and argue that his or 
her confession before a truth commission amounts to having been tried and 
convicted for the same offence s/he is charged with under the ICC Statute. He 
however notes that this is likely to give rise to two problems: Firstly, the Statute 
refers to ‘trial by another court’ and the term court is not inclusive of a truth 
commission; and the fact that Article 20 is not applicable to proceedings 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.179 
 
Keller also disputes the applicability of Article 20, stating that it is unlikely that the 
Court will regard truth commissions and such similar procedures as qualifying to 
be courts according to the Rome Statute.180 She further maintains that even if the 
interpretation would be liberal enough to include TJRM within the meaning of the 
term ‘court’, there would still be a second hurdle to clear in which an analysis will 
have to be made of whether the investigations were conducted impartially or 
                                                 
179 Scharf, M.P. Supra note 43. 526. 
180 Keller, M.L. Supra note 117. 26. 
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independently181. Keller also asserts that the TJRM may not have the shielding 
effect as its priority, but that this it could be its eventual consequence182. She 
continues her argument by contending that the TJRM will be challenged to meet 
the requirements of ‘due process’ and of ‘bringing the person to justice’183. She, 
however, concludes that the language of Article 20 is malleable and that the Court 
can still apply it to a TJRM.184 
 
The concept of ne bis in idem from comparative, European and International law 
indicates a specific reference to criminal proceedings.185 With respect to article 20, 
article 57 of the International law Commission (hereafter ILC) draft and the 
discussions during the Prepcom indicated a reference to actual prosecutions.186 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter ICTY) has 
ruled that there can be no violation of ne bis in idem, under any known formulation 
of the principle, unless the accused has already been tried.187 The language of the 
Provision refers to a situation where a person has either been ‘convicted or 
acquitted’ by the ‘court’.188 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, even if 
organised as quasi judicial bodies, do not qualify as courts in the sense of Article 
20.189 
 
                                                 
181 Ibid, 27. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid, 28. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Trifterer, O. Supra note 129. 673. 
186Lee, S.R. Supra note 100. 57-8. 
187 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non bis in idem, 
Trial Chamber, 14 Nov. 1995, para. 24. 
188 Article 20(1) Rome Statute. 
189 Trifterer, O. Supra note 129. 685. 
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This research makes a conclusion that non-prosecutorial mechanisms do not 
qualify to be called ‘trials’190 and further that this provision only refers to judicial 
decisions. 191  
 
Article 53 
Article 53 speaks of two levels of prosecutorial discretion: 
 
Level one: The discretion to commence an investigation once the Prosecutor has 
received all the relevant information – Article (53) (1). When making this 
decision, Prosecutor must consider, inter alia, the following: 
- The admissibility of the case under Article 17;  
- Whether, taking into account of the gravity of the crime and the 
interests of the victims, there are grounds to believe that the 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.    
  
Level two: The discretion to proceed with the prosecution, having carried out the 
investigation (53(2)). When making this decision, the Prosecutor must make the 
following considerations in part: 
- The admissibility of the case under Article 17; and 
- Based on all the circumstances of the case, including the gravity of the crime and 
the age or infirmity of the perpetrator, a prosecution would not serve the interests 
of justice. 
                                                 
190Robinson, D. Supra note 12. 484.  
191 Aravena, C.C. Supra note 144. 134. 
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These considerations include only those that most closely pertain to the main 
subject matter of our discussion. 
 
The ambiguity:  
The use of the terms ‘taking into account’ under Article 53(1) and ‘all 
circumstances’ including ...’ under Article 53(2) indicate a lack of fullness and 
exhaustiveness in the list of the considerations that inform the exercise of 
Prosecutorial discretion. This means that other similar elements may be applied so 
long as they bear general resemblance to those in those in the non-exhaustive list.  
 
The other ambiguity crops up when one is looks at the rest of Statute in so far as it 
concerns the term ‘interests of justice.’ The Preamble and Article 1 seem to preach 
different gospels compared to that of Article 53. The Preamble and Article 1 state 
that the primary priority of the ICC is criminal prosecutions, while Article 53 on 
the other hand, implies that there are other considerations that may feed into the 
decision of whether or not to undertake investigations and to institute prosecutions 
subsequently.  
 
In as much as the overall philosophy of criminal prosecutions is clear in many 
parts of the Statute, it is submitted that there is lack of clarity as far as other 
articles contemplate considerations that may lower criminal prosecutions from 
being a first priority. Indeed, this appearance of mixed intentions has been labelled 
as schizophrenic in that the Rome Statute Preamble espouses an obligation to 
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prosecute while other articles indicate permissiveness in the applicability of the 
amnesty provision.192 
 
In a move indicative of the lack of clarity of the term ‘interests of justice’ under 
article 53, the ICC’s  Office of the Prosecutor, in the period between December 
2004 and April 2005, asked a group of leading non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to submit interpretations of the "interests of justice" provision.193 The 
purpose of this so that the ICC could hear from the NGOs on what they thought of 
the issues of security and stability in relation to the prosecutorial discretion of the 
ICC Prosecutor.194 
 
The discussion on Article 53 can be narrowed down to considering whether the 
phrase ‘interests of justice’ can be construed to be inclusive of TJRM/Amnesties. 
The question that is posed is whether ‘interests’ are retributive criminal justice 
interests or whether they also include broader concepts of justice, including those 
of restorative justice.195 
 
Authors have expressed various thoughts, which will be analyzed prior to drawing 
some conclusions. 
 
                                                 
192 Scharf, M.P. Supra note 43, 522. 
193 http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=interestofjustice&idudctp=21&show=all#21 accessed on 15th August 2009 
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Firstly, it should be noted that out of all the four provisions that this research has 
looked at, there is general concurrence that Article 53 is the proper avenue for 
addressing TJRM/Amnesties.196 
 
Ambos makes an argument, stating that there could be processes which would be 
admissible under Article 17 but which would only be saved from the ICC 
jurisdiction by the grace of Article 53. He gives an example where it is obvious 
from the start that the investigations of a TJRM will not lead to prosecutions since 
they are precluded by an amnesty. These investigations would obviously not 
correspond to the requirement under Article 17(1) b, which is discussed above, as 
there is no option of considering prosecutions anyway197. He states that both 
Article 53(1) c and 53(2) c require the Prosecutor to consider legal criteria 
mentioned ‘intrinsically and extrinsically’ in the provisions. These criteria are the 
gravity of the crime, the interests of the victims, the age or infirmity of the alleged 
offender, and his role in the perpetration of the crime. In addition, the Prosecutor 
has to take into consideration the legality of amnesties under international law.198 
 
Robinson, concludes that the consideration of ‘interests of justice’ were meant to be 
inclusive of broader concepts of justice, beyond the traditional retributive mechanism, 
in that Article 53 exemplifies the considerations upon which the Prosecutor exercises 
his discretion, such as the interests of the victims and the gravity of the crime.199 
                                                 
196 Kourabas, M. Supra note 20. 61; Scharf, M.P. Supra note 43. 524.  
197 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 70. 
198  Ambos, K. Supra note 40. 71. 
199 Robinson D. Supra note 12. 488. 
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Abigail is of the view that the Prosecutor’s discretion to regard TJRM/Amnesties 
under Article 53 is legally acceptable and is in fact warranted by the state of 
international law as far as CAH and war crimes are concerned whose obligation to 
prosecute is vague.200 She thereafter concludes that Article53 is the most suitable 
provision to consider the applicability of TJRM/Amnesties.201 According to this writer 
therefore, TJRM are applicable under Article 53, as long as they relate to the crimes 
that do not carry an international obligation to prosecute202. 
 
As far as an interpretation in line with the VCLT is concerned, this research fully 
agrees with the analysis of Koroubas and Ambos. 
Koroubas starts by looking at the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘interests of justice’. 
According to Webster’s Dictionary ‘justice’ means" the administration of law; 
especially: the establishment or determination of rights according to the rules of law or 
equity."203 Koroubas then analyses the meaning of ‘interests of justice’ in accordance 
with the objects and purposes of the Statute as is mandated by international law.204 He 
makes an argument that indeed the object that is expressed in the Preamble is one of 
ensuring criminal prosecution.  
 
                                                 
200 Moy, A. ‘The International Criminal Court’s Arrest Warrants and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing 
the Debate over Amnesty and Complementarity’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal. 272. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Kourabas, M. Supra note 20. 71. 
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Ambos states that ‘justice’ is not limited to criminal justice but encompasses alternative 
forms of justice as well. He continues to state that justice entails an overall assessment 
of the situation, taking into account peace and reconciliation as the ultimate goals of 
every process of transition. In arriving at this assessment, he refers to the approaches 
adopted by several writers who maintain that the considerations must be made on a case 
by case basis in deciding whether the formal initiation of an investigation would 
jeopardize higher interests in the broad sense.205 
 
From the outset, this research paper mentions the granting of a rather ‘extra’ 
determinative criterion to the Prosecutor when deciding whether or not to undertake 
investigations or Prosecutions (over and above the one in Article 17). This is shown in 
that Article 17 is included in Article 53 as ‘one of the bases’ upon which the Prosecutor 
may determine the admissibility of a case.206 Ambos is also of the same understanding, 
and sees this as the granting of additional discretion to the Prosecutor.207 
 
In view of the generality of the views from the hand of academic writers above, this 
research finds Article 53 to be the most suitable avenue for considering 
TJRM/Amnesties. 
 
                                                 
205Ibid. 
206 Article 53(1) b Rome Statute. 
207 Ambos, K. Supra note 30. 69. 
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b.                                         Chapter Four 
 
                            Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
a. General Remarks 
 
It is observed, which observation is agreed with here, that International law does indeed 
embrace a dichotomy which on the one hand, recognizes that war crimes, CAH and 
genocide invoke a duty to prosecute and that perpetrators must not escape with 
impunity, and on the other hand recognizes the plight of societies in transition.208 ICL 
cannot completely dismiss amnesties, as they are sometimes essential to facilitate 
national reconciliation.209 An example of such a situation is where a civil war will only 
be ended if no prosecutions are carried out.210 
As far as amnesties are concerned, the Rome Statute allows for their application where 
they are consistent with justice.211 The existence of prosecutorial discretion gives a 
practical doorway for the appreciation of this dichotomy.212  
 
This research submits that there are two clear avenues through which TJRM can be 
considered under the Rome Statute. These are Articles 17 and 53, with Article 53 being 
the more preferred option. A conclusion one may draw, even though it might be 
potentially risky one, is that the body of the Rome Statute does allow for TJRM which 
have met certain qualifications, as the discussed above.  
                                                 
208 Goldstone, J.R. & Fritz, N. Supra note 89. 655. 
209 Werle, G. Supra note 35. 77. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Goldstone, J.R. & Fritz, N. Supra note 89. 655. 
212 Ibid. 656. 
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b. Application: The Republic of Kenya 
 
i.  Background 
The Kenyan situation got attention from the International Community following the 
2007 post election violence that left over 1,100 dead and over 650,000 internally 
displaced.213 The Commission of inquiry into the Post Election Violence (hereafter 
CIPEV) was established among other measures to investigate the causes and the nature 
of the violence. The report of the commission was released on October 15th 2008.214 
According to the report, only minor offenders would be granted amnesty while the rest 
(the most responsible for Genocide and Crimes against Humanity) would be prosecuted 
under a Special Tribunal that was recommended to be set up within 60 days of 
submitting the report or else a list containing names of alleged perpetrators would be 
handed to the ICC. 
 
On December 17th 2008 the Agreement to establish the tribunal was signed, but on 
February 2009, the Constitutional amendment bill that would have established the 
Tribunal was defeated. A deadline of September 30th 2009 for the creation of the 
tribunal was given by the ICC Prosecutor. At the time of completing this paper (20th 
October 2009) no such tribunal has been established.  
                                                 
213 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 6, available at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.pdf. (accessed 
20th October, 2009). 
214 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
After Kenya missed the 30th September deadline to set up a national tribunal to address 
the post-election violence, the Prosecutor announced that the ICC would prosecute 
those who are most responsible while national mechanisms would take care of other 
perpetrators215. 
 
Previously, the ICC Prosecutor had noted that the Kenyan government was committed 
to making a state referral by June 2010216. However in a meeting held, the President 
and the Prime Minister reportedly stated that they will not formally write to the ICC 
Prosecutor referring the Kenyan situation to the ICC for investigation and possible 
prosecution217.  
 
The steps that Kenya has taken so far, besides CIPEV, include the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission which has been established under the Truth Justice and 
Reconciliation Act No. 84 of 2008218. The TJRC has investigative powers219, powers to 
recommend prosecutions after the investigations have been carried out,220 and the 
power to recommend amnesties221 with the exception of genocide, crimes against 
                                                 
215 http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/kenya/
pr456?lan=en-GB;http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/09/30/kenya.election.icc/index.html. (accessed on 
20th October 2009).  
216 http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/2E58546F-0337-479F-9EC5-DE2F489EBFDC.htm(accessed on 20th October 
2009). 
217 Godfrey Musila, ‘Why Ocampo will have to act on his own’. The Standard Published on available on 
14/10/2009http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/commentaries/InsidePage.php?id=1144026328&cid=15 
218 http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php 
219 Art 7 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 84 of 2008, Laws of Kenya. 
220 Art 5(d) Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 84 of 2008 Laws of Kenya. 
221 Art 5(f) Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 84 of 2008 Laws of Kenya. 
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humanity or grave violation of human rights.222  The TJRC has however not started 
carrying out its functions. 
 
Besides, the steps that have been taken, certain elements cast doubt on the 
government’s willingness to genuinely prosecute as would be required under Art. 17 of 
the Rome Statute. Some of these include the delay of establishing the Tribunal since the 
signing of the Agreement, over and above the failure to meet the proposed 30th 
September deadline, the allegations that a number of those named as suspects to face 
prosecution are prominent persons and cabinet ministers in the current government, the 
defeat of the bill that was to establish the tribunal and the fact that despite Kenya 
ratifying the ICC statute in 2005 it only entered into force on 1st January 2009. 
 
However, as stated in the discussions under Article 17, in order to make a 
determination of unwillingness, an assessment of the overall ‘purpose’ and ‘motive’ of 
the government must be made. The admissibility criteria must consider whether there 
are ongoing effective proceedings which would make the case inadmissible. One clear 
conclusion can however be made, that Kenya is far from being considered ‘inactive’ as 
far as the post-election violence is concerned. 
As far as the Kenyan TJRC is concerned, an analysis must be made on whether this is a 
deliberate move intended to ‘shield’ the perpetrators (in accordance with the 
requirement of genuineness discussed under article 17).  
 
                                                 
222 Art 34 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 84 of 2008 Laws of Kenya. 
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Due to the timing of this paper and the limited available information, any conclusions 
as to whether a clear situation of admissibility or inadmissibility has been made would 
be premature. It is however hoped that any steps taken, either by the international 
community or by the national authorities will be both responsive to the need to fight 
impunity as well the need for national reconciliation for age old conflicts. 
 
2.1 Recommendations 
This research suggests that the Prosecutor must develop a Prosecutorial strategy in 
exercising his discretion under Article 53. His discretion, this research humbly submits, 
should be guided by applying a contextual approach, addressing each particular case by 
reference to all relevant factors, including political and social factors.  
With specific reference to TJRM, the ICC must consider giving guidelines on what must 
be borne in mind when considering whether a specific TJRM will be considered in place 
of criminal prosecutions before the ICC.  
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